Institutions and Performance of Regulated Firms: Evidence from Electric Utilities in the Indian States by Jamasb, T. et al.
                                                               
                                   
 
 
  
 
Cambridge Working Paper Economics: 1823 
 
INSTITUTIONS AND PERFORMANCE OF REGULATED 
FIRMS: EVIDENCE FROM ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN THE 
INDIAN STATES 
 
22 March 2018 
 
It is commonly accepted that institutions influence economic development of countries. But, 
can we also trace the effect of institutional endowment to specific sectors and regions of a 
country? There is a significant gap in knowledge and evidence of this issue in the literature. 
This paper examines this effect in the Indian electricity distribution sector and explores the 
influence of state-level institutional quality and economic factors on the performance of 
network utilities in India. Since the 1990s, India has adopted reform steps to improve the 
efficiency of its electricity sector. However, there remain performance differences among 
the utilities. We examine the performance of 52 electricity distribution utilities in 24 Indian 
states for the period from 2006-07 to 2011-12. The findings confirm that the quality of 
institutions and state-wide economic development affect the performance of the electricity 
distribution utilities in different states. Additionally, we simulate the cost savings from utilities’ 
performance improvements linked with institutional enhancements. The results indicate the 
need to strengthen the institutions, for example through regulatory agencies reform to 
improve the performance of the sector. 
 
Tooraj Jamasb Manuel Llorca Pavan Khetrapal Tripta Thakur  
      
Cambridge Working Paper Economics 
 
Faculty of Economics 
  
www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk 
 
 Institutions and Performance of Regulated 
Firms: Evidence from Electric Utilities in the 
Indian States 
EPRG Working Paper      1809 
Cambridge Working Paper in Economics      1823 
Tooraj Jamasb, Manuel Llorca, Pavan 
Khetrapal, Tripta Thakur 
 
Abstract   
It is commonly accepted that institutions influence economic development of countries. But, 
can we also trace the effect of institutional endowment to specific sectors and regions of a 
country? There is a significant gap in knowledge and evidence of this issue in the literature. 
This paper examines this effect in the Indian electricity distribution sector and explores the 
influence of state-level institutional quality and economic factors on the performance of 
network utilities in India. Since the 1990s, India has adopted reform steps to improve the 
efficiency of its electricity sector. However, there remain performance differences among the 
utilities. We examine the performance of 52 electricity distribution utilities in 24 Indian states 
for the period from 2006-07 to 2011-12. The findings confirm that the quality of institutions 
and state-wide economic development affect the performance of the electricity distribution 
utilities in different states. Additionally, we simulate the cost savings from utilities’ 
performance improvements linked with institutional enhancements. The results indicate the 
need to strengthen the institutions, for example through regulatory agencies reform to improve 
the performance of the sector. 
 
Keywords: Quality of state institutions; electricity distribution in India; 
heteroscedastic stochastic frontier models; inefficiency determinants. 
 
JEL Classification D22, L51, L94, O43 
Contact tooraj.jamasb@durham.ac.uk  
Publication  March 2018 
Financial Support Durham Energy Institute (DEI) and the Institute of Advanced Studies, 
Durham University. 
1 
 
Institutions and Performance of Regulated Firms: 
Evidence from Electric Utilities in the Indian States 
 
 
Tooraj Jamasb 
a
, Manuel Llorca 
a*
, Pavan Khetrapal 
b
, Tripta Thakur 
b
 
a 
Durham University Business School, Durham University, United Kingdom 
b 
Department of Electrical Engineering, National Institute of Technology, MANIT-Bhopal, India 
 
20 March 2018 
 
 
Abstract 
It is commonly accepted that institutions influence economic development of 
countries. But, can we also trace the effect of institutional endowment to specific 
sectors and regions of a country? There is a significant gap in knowledge and evidence 
of this issue in the literature. This paper examines this effect in the Indian electricity 
distribution sector and explores the influence of state-level institutional quality and 
economic factors on the performance of network utilities in India. Since the 1990s, 
India has adopted reform steps to improve the efficiency of its electricity sector. 
However, there remain performance differences among the utilities. We examine the 
performance of 52 electricity distribution utilities in 24 Indian states for the period 
from 2006-07 to 2011-12. The findings confirm that the quality of institutions and 
state-wide economic development affect the performance of the electricity distribution 
utilities in different states. Additionally, we simulate the cost savings from utilities’ 
performance improvements linked with institutional enhancements. The results 
indicate the need to strengthen the institutions, for example through regulatory 
agencies reform to improve the performance of the sector. 
 
 
Keywords: quality of state institutions; electricity distribution in India; 
heteroscedastic stochastic frontier models; inefficiency determinants. 
 
JEL classification: D22, L51, L94, O43. 
 
                                                          
*
 Corresponding author: Durham University Business School, Mill Hill Lane, Durham, DH1 3LB, United 
Kingdom. Tel: +44 (0)191 3345741. E-mail: manuel.llorca@durham.ac.uk. 
 
Acknowledgements: The authors acknowledge support from the Durham Energy Institute (DEI) and the 
Institute of Advanced Studies, Durham University; Oviedo Efficiency Group (OEG), University of 
Oviedo; and the participants in the XV European Workshop on Efficiency and Productivity analysis 
(EWEPA), London, June 12-15, 2017. 
2 
 
 
1. Introduction 
There is ample evidence in the literature and it is commonly accepted that the quality of 
institutions have a significant influence on the economic development of countries (see 
Easterly and Levine, 2003; Acemoglu et al., 2002). But, can we also trace the effect of 
institutional endowment down to the level of specific sectors and regions of countries? 
There is, however, scarce knowledge and empirical evidence of such effects at the 
micro-level. In this paper we set out to examine the possible effect of state-level 
institutional quality and economic development on the performance of electricity 
distribution utilities in India. 
The reform trend in the electricity sector began in the 1990s and spread to many 
countries around the world. This concurred with new developments in regulatory 
economics aimed at improving the efficiency of network industries (see Shleifer, 1985; 
Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Littlechild, 1983). In general, generation and retailing of 
electricity is potentially competitive while transmission and distribution networks are 
natural monopolies. The importance of the regulation of the networks has frequently 
been highlighted because of their impact on social welfare (e.g., Joskow, 2014). A 
significant issue in the regulation of network utilities is to provide them with incentives 
to improve efficiency (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2007). 
Incentive-based regulation has become the dominant mode to replacing alternatives 
such as cost-of-service regulation.
1
 Some regulation models are based on the utilities’ 
performance evaluation measured through benchmarking methods. The identification of 
best-performing (or ‘frontier’) firms allows measuring the relative efficiency of the 
firms in the sector. The main objective of the sector regulator is to protect the interests 
of consumers and ensure that they benefit from the efficiency gains in the competitive 
as well as the regulated segments (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2007). 
Since the 1990s, India has implemented a number of reform steps to improve the 
efficiency of the electricity sector. However, significant performance differences seem 
to persist among the utilities across the country. This is evidenced by various empirical 
studies that use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to measure the efficiency of 
electricity distribution utilities in India or in specific states (Bobde and Tanaka, 2018; 
Yadav et al., 2013, 2011, 2010; Saxena and Thakur, 2011; Meenakumari et al., 2009; 
and Thakur et al., 2006. It is possible that the observed disparity in the efficiency of the 
utilities is partly the result of the differences in the institutional endowment of the 
different states. 
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 Cost-of-service regulation is based on firms’ actual costs. Shleifer (1985) indicates that under this 
regulation model, economic welfare may drop well below the optimum level. 
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The “Electricity Act, 2003” (with amendments in 2004, 2007 and 2008) and now called 
as Electricity (Amendment) Act, 2014, and downstream policies have led to some 
important changes in the sector in the last decade by initiating corporatisation, 
unbundling, competition, accountability and private sector participation (Shukla and 
Thampy, 2011). In addition, corruption remains a longstanding pressing issue in the 
Indian electricity sector and it can be directly related to the lack of transparency and 
poor institutional endowment (Thakur et al., 2004). The enactment of the “Electricity 
Act, 2003” was expected to address these issues. 
Electricity sector policy in India have also other objectives that include improving 
electrification, reducing network energy losses, and managing cross subsidies. 
However, these objectives have also yielded inefficiencies in the sector (Thakur et al., 
2006). India started its electricity sector reform from 1991 by allowing the entrance of 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) (Sharma et al., 2005) with mixed success to attract 
the much needed investments in the sector. In addition, of the 1.4 billion of the world 
population who lack access to electricity, India accounts for over 300 million of them 
(IEA, 2015). 
In this paper we analyse the effects of state-level institutional endowment on cost 
efficiency of electricity distribution utilities in respective states of India from 2006-07 
to 2011-2012. Electricity distribution networks are very suitable for studying efficiency 
effects of institutions as they are generally modular systems and are rather similar in 
main aspects of their design. We estimate a set of Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) 
models to evaluate the influence of institutional endowments of states on the 
performance of the sector. In addition, we examine the effect of economic factors such 
as GDP and its growth rate on the performance of the network utilities. In India, there is 
a strong policy focus on achieving social objectives and, in particular, on electrification. 
However, this has also led to large and persistent network energy losses and 
inefficiencies in the sector. We also examine the role of network energy losses which is 
costly for the sector and environmental quality. 
This remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly summarises the 
literature on the effect of institutions on economic performance and focuses on the case 
of India and particularly on the electricity sector. In Section 3 we introduce the 
methodological approach and the stochastic frontier models that are estimated. Section 4 
presents the data and variables employed in the analysis and reports the estimates and 
the post estimation analysis of these, which includes a simulation of potential cost 
savings per state from incremental enhancements in institutional quality. Section 5 is 
conclusions. 
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2. Electricity Distribution and State Institutions in India 
In many developing countries, a combination of ineffective state institutions, market 
imperfections and poor infrastructure hinder the effectiveness of economic and social 
policies. One of the affected sectors is the electricity industry, where poor performance 
is a cause of poor economic development (Di Bella and Grigoli, 2016; Balza et al., 
2013). Barriers to expanding access to electricity are financial and economic; capacity 
and technical; and policy and institutional (Sovacool, 2012; Watson et al., 2012; Nepal 
and Jamasb, 2012). Dramani and Tewari (2014) examine the institutions and electricity 
sector performance in Ghana and find that institutions positively influence the reserve 
margin and installed capacity and have the potential to increase the reliability and 
efficiency of distribution utilities. 
Electricity is a concurrent subject in India, with multiple jurisdictions – i.e. centre, state 
and at Panchayat level).
2
 A key reform step has been the unbundling of the sector into 
its four main constituent functions, namely generation, transmission, distribution and 
retailing of electricity.
3
 The expansion of the transmission system has been carried out 
based on detailed technical studies and is rather planned. However, the distribution 
system has grown in an unplanned and haphazard manner making it incapable of 
meeting the objective of fulfilling the growing demands of consumers on an urgent 
basis.
4
 The unplanned development of distribution sector, over time, has created an 
inefficient distribution system. 
Indian electricity distribution caters to nearly 200 million consumers having a connected 
load of about 400 GW. The consumers are served by around 73 distribution utilities 
(MoP, 2016).
5
 Despite the reforms, in the form of corporatisation and unbundling, the 
distribution sector is having large financial losses making the sector unsustainable 
(Shunglu Committee, 2011). Bhattacharya and Patel (2008) discuss the systemic flaws 
and sector vulnerabilities of the sector and suggest a commercial orientation of the 
utilities, improving revenues and cash flow, and deep sectorial reforms based on 
competition and private ownership. 
                                                          
2
 The Panchayati Raj system in India was formalised in 1992 for more decentralised administration, as a 
system of governance in which gram panchayats are the basic units of local administration. The system 
has three levels: Gram Panchayat (village-level), Mandal Parishad or Block Samiti or Panchayat Samiti 
(block-level), and Zila Parishad (district-level). 
3
 Many reforming countries, mainly in developing countries, have not separated the retail function from 
the distribution function for some or all types of consumers. 
4
 Under an ambitious central scheme, the Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY), access 
to electricity, measured in terms of electrified villages, rose from 59% in 2000 to almost 95% at the end 
of 2013 (CEA, 2014). Note that access figures differ with alternative measures. For instance, when using 
the percentage of households with access the number falls to 74% in 2010 (Banerjee et al., 2014). 
5
 73 distribution utilities consisting of 13 electricity departments, 17 private distribution companies, 41 
corporatised distribution companies and 2 State Electricity Boards (SEBs). 
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Consequently, the electricity distribution in India is characterised by inefficiency, low 
productivity, frequent interruption in supply and poor voltage, among other features, 
and all this despite the restructured Accelerated Power Development and Reforms 
Programme (APDRP) and the Restructured Accelerated Power Development and 
Reforms Programme (R-APDRP) funding.
6
 India’s reform policies have not been able 
to achieve reliable, efficient power because distribution reforms have not been carried 
out (Bag et al., 2014). In order, to overcome the difficulties leading to technical and 
governance challenges, a radical restructuring of the sector has been prescribed (Tankha 
et al., 2010). As a result, the Ministry of Power (MoP), Government of India, has been 
taking reform initiatives including unbundling,
7
 corporatisation, privatisation and 
outsourcing of various services of the distribution sector. 
With the enactment of the Electricity Regulatory Act (ERC Act 1998), state and central 
regulators were introduced as independent, autonomous institutions in the sector. At 
centre level, Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) was formed, which 
lays down the major guidelines and has jurisdiction over both centrally-owned utilities 
and inter-state transmission and trade issues. In addition, each federal state was 
mandated to have its own regulatory authority known as State Electricity Regulatory 
Commissions (SERCs) with regulatory oversight at the state-level. With the federal 
structure, India regulators have freedom and flexibility to implement reforms. The 
regulators have impacted the sector by introducing own tariffs, dispute resolution and 
increasing confidence to reform process. State regulators decide tariff based on cost plus 
regulation, incentive regulation is not followed by any regulators, but its provision 
exists in the “Electricity Act, 2003”. 
The oversight role of the state regulators is crucial for the functioning of the sector the 
quality of which is an important aspect of institutional quality and performance of the 
utilities (Erdogdu, 2013). Ghosh and Kathuria (2016) addressed the impact of 
institutional quality typified as regulatory governance on the performance of thermal 
generation plants in India, but no study is reported for the distribution sector. Thus, it is 
important to explore the links between quality of institutions and performance of the 
Indian distribution utilities regardless of ownership. The paper finds that institutional 
endowment is essential for the performance of the electricity sector. 
                                                          
6
 R-APDRP started in 2008 is a revised version of the APDRP. The APDRP scheme was initiated in 
2002-03 assistance from the centre to the states to reduce the average technical and commercial losses 
and improve the quality and reliability of service. This was to be achieved by strengthening and 
upgrading the sub-transmission and distribution system of high-density load centres. R-APDRP is for 
urban areas, i.e., towns and cities with a population more than 30,000 people (10,000 people in special 
category states). The focus of R-APDRP is on actual, demonstrable performance, and achieving sustained 
reduction in energy losses. 
7
 Presently, most states have unbundled their erstwhile SEBs and have corporatised the successor entities 
having one generation and transmission company and many distribution companies according to the 
requirement of the states. Some Indian states like Tamil Nadu and Punjab unbundled their SEBs into two 
entities; one dedicated to transmission and another for both generation and distribution. 
6 
 
We represent the institutional framework through a set of variables that can be 
considered proxies for institutional quality and state intervention, and have an effect on 
electricity distribution firms’ cost efficiency. The model captures the effect of 
institutions on transaction costs that ultimately should affect the viability and 
profitability of the economic activity (North, 1990). 
 
3. Methodology 
In this section we introduce the theoretical cost function used to estimate and analyse 
the performance of the electricity distribution firms in our sample. The estimation 
approach will allow us to obtain important features such as cost elasticities or marginal 
costs that permit to study economic characteristics of the technology in the sector. In 
general terms, a total cost function can be described as follows: 
     C = f(y, w, x, β)     (1) 
where C represents total firms’ costs, y is a set of outputs that often includes delivered 
energy and customers, w are the prices of the inputs labour and capital, x are other 
control variables and β are the parameters to be estimated. 
Starting from Aigner et al. (1977) (ALS henceforth) and Meeusen and van den Broeck 
(1977) the SFA literature has been developed based on the idea that deviations with 
respect to cost (or alternatively production) functions, such as in equation (1), should be 
attributed to inefficiency in firms’ management and to random shocks. The authors 
proposed econometric models that include two random terms that simultaneously 
measure controlled and uncontrolled differences with respect to a frontier. This 
methodology allows obtaining a best-practice frontier that can be used to identify 
benchmarks in firms’ performance. According to this approach, and after taking 
logarithms,
8
 equation (1) can be written as in (2): 
ln Cit = ln f(yit, wit, xit, β) + vit + uit   (2) 
where i stands for the firm and t for time, v is a standard noise term that follows a 
normal distribution and u is a one-sided error term that captures firms’ cost inefficiency. 
An interesting issue that it is worth to analyse is the likely existence of factors that may 
affect the performance of the companies. 
                                                          
8
 The equation is presented in a linear form through taking logarithms of the variables included in the 
model. This strategy makes easier the interpretation of the β-parameters estimated as they can be directly 
interpreted as elasticities. 
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A shortcoming of the models proposed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van 
den Broeck (1977) is that this circumstance is not taken into account. It is important 
then to note that if this matter is not properly addressed it can yield biased estimates of 
the parameters of the model and the efficiency scores due to heteroscedasticity issues 
(Caudill and Ford, 1993). This question is frequently encountered in the SFA literature 
and some studies have explored strategies to address this matter. There are several 
frontier approaches, namely parametric, nonparametric and semi-parametric (or semi-
nonparametric) that can be applied in utility benchmarking to measure firms’ 
performance. Each approach has pros and cons, thus the choice of a specific approach is 
arguable and may influence the results and policy implications derived. Coelli et al. 
(2005) propose estimating alternative models in order to assess the robustness and 
appropriateness of the results obtained for a given selected approach. 
The (parametric) SFA models that can be applied to estimate the determinants of firms’ 
inefficiency can be divided in three categories depending on how these contextual 
variables (also called environmental or z-variables) are included in the model. These z-
variables can be introduced through the pre-truncation mean, the pre-truncation variance 
or in both places of the inefficiency term of the model. It should be noted that the 
selection of an appropriate functional form and model suitable to deal for the 
assessment of efficiency determinants in SFA is ultimately an empirical issue. 
Llorca et al. (2016) summarise the models that can be applied with different frontier 
approaches to address the presence of environmental factors that may affect the 
performance of firms. The study estimates several models proposed in the SFA 
literature to analyse the influence of environmental variables (mainly weather 
conditions) on the performance of transmission networks in the US. Several studies 
include environmental factors to evaluate performance of transmission and distribution 
utilities (e.g., Yu et al., 2009; Growitsch et al., 2012; Kuosmanen, 2012; Orea et al., 
2015). However, these studies are focused on firm-specific factors that affect individual 
performance and not on the general context of the sector or the country. We are 
interested in the effect of institutions on the performance of distribution firms through 
analysing the performance of utilities in different states. 
In this paper we follow the model of Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), Caudill and 
Ford (1993) and Caudill et al. (1995) (RSCFG henceforth), which satisfies the so-called 
scaling property. The specific characteristic of the models that fulfil this property is that 
changes in the environmental variables affect the scale but not the shape of the 
inefficiency term (Álvarez et al., 2006). This implies that the inefficiency term can be 
decomposed in a multiplicative way as follows: 
uit(zit, δ) = h(zit, δ)uit
∗     (3) 
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where h(zit, δ) is a scaling function that is always positive, zit denotes environmental 
variables introduced in the model, δ is a set of parameters to be estimated and uit
∗  is a 
measure of “raw” inefficiency that does not depend on zit. This property facilitates the 
interpretation of the effect of the environmental variables on mean efficiency, as δ does 
not depend on the distribution of inefficiency (Wang and Schmidt, 2002). In particular, 
in the RSCFG model, uit follows a half-normal distribution (like in the ALS model) and 
the scaling function presents an exponential functional form. Therefore, the standard 
deviation of the inefficiency term in that model can be expressed as: 
   σit = σu exp(zit
′ δ)     (4) 
As a consequence, the estimates of δ are simply the derivatives of the logarithm of the 
inefficiency with respect to the z-variables. Considering the same particular conditions 
for the inefficiency term and the scaling function assumed by Caudill et al. (1995), the 
stylised cost function to be estimated can be presented in the following form: 
ln Cit = ln f(yit, wit, xit, β) + vit + exp(zit
′ δ) uit
∗    (5) 
 
4. Data and Results 
This section presents the data, the econometric specification of the model and the 
results.
9
 We have a balanced panel data that contains information on 52 electricity 
distribution utilities, which operate in 24 Indian states.
10
 The sample period goes from 
2006-2007 to 2011-2012. The relatively short period of time should not be an issue 
here, since the main source of institutional differences in our sample comes from the 
comparison between states (between-units variation) and not over time (within-units 
variation).  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables that we include in our 
analysis.
11
 Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients of the variables. The correlations 
among the technical variables are relatively large (higher than 60%). This is 
commonplace in the efficiency studies of the electricity transmission and distribution 
networks. On the other hand, the correlations among other variables and, in particular, 
among the institutional variables, which will be introduced as efficiency determinants in 
the model, are much smaller, nearly always smaller than 50%. 
                                                          
9
 All the models presented in this paper are estimated by maximum likelihood. 
10
 The states included in this analysis are: Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Delhi, Goa, 
Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya 
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Meghalaya, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, 
Uttarakhand and West Bengal. 
11
 For a detailed definition and sources of the variables, see the Appendix. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics for data on electricity distribution firms in India 
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Total Distribution Cost (D_COST) Crore rupees (2011) 1,388 1,993 123 22,506 
Energy Sold (ENE) MU’s 10,370 11,725 395 80,132 
Customers (CUS) Number of people 3,261,180 3,866,851 230,580 23,180,000 
Energy Losses (LOS) MU’s 4,166 4,474 163 33,785 
Distribution Capacity (DCA) MVA 7,895 8,206 492 62,194 
Labour Price (LPR) Crore rupees (2011) 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.14 
Capital Price (KPR) Index 117.68 4.80 110.12 125.08 
Private Utility (PRIV) Dummy 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Average Technical and Commercial Losses (AT&C) % 29.69 14.48 6.12 83.68 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Crore rupees (2011) 336,369 227,767 11,759 1,112,220 
Growth of GDP (GRW) % 8.51 4.44 -5.98 22.47 
Human Development Index (HDI) Index in 2008 0.50 0.11 0.36 0.79 
President’s Rule (PRESI) Number of times 0.04 0.21 0 1 
Coalition Government (COALI) Number of times 0.08 0.35 0 2 
Surfaced Road Length to Total Road Length (ROAD) % 64.10 21.03 11.55 93.55 
Share of Public Expenditure in GDP (EXP) % 6.06 2.07 1.31 16.55 
Share of Secondary Sector in GDP (SESEC) % 29.87 7.59 10.67 48.16 
Note: MU’s stands for million units. 1 MU is equivalent to 1,000 megawatt hours (MWh). MVA represents megavolt-amperes, a measure of apparent power. 
 
Table 2: Correlation matrix of variables 
 
D_COST ENE CUS LOS DCA LPR KPR PRIV AT&C GDP GRW HDI PRESI COALI ROAD EXP SESEC 
D_COST 1 0.731 0.732 0.481 0.575 0.130 0.113 -0.163 -0.153 0.215 0.076 0.131 -0.085 -0.062 0.200 -0.300 -0.069 
ENE 0.731 1 0.930 0.687 0.881 0.038 0.113 -0.207 -0.236 0.427 -0.012 0.159 -0.089 -0.071 0.315 -0.358 -0.013 
CUS 0.732 0.930 1 0.602 0.816 0.052 0.085 -0.240 -0.243 0.405 -0.026 0.192 -0.041 -0.051 0.195 -0.332 -0.091 
LOS 0.481 0.687 0.602 1 0.684 0.139 0.047 -0.258 0.386 0.253 0.008 -0.138 -0.071 0.014 0.155 -0.103 -0.046 
DCA 0.575 0.881 0.816 0.684 1 0.094 0.130 -0.225 -0.149 0.425 0.004 0.113 -0.099 -0.113 0.253 -0.274 -0.137 
LPR 0.130 0.038 0.052 0.139 0.094 1 0.273 0.038 0.207 -0.140 -0.035 0.063 -0.005 -0.024 -0.050 0.092 -0.221 
KPR 0.113 0.113 0.085 0.047 0.130 0.273 1 0.000 -0.100 0.170 -0.342 0.000 -0.061 -0.148 0.127 0.089 -0.072 
PRIV -0.163 -0.207 -0.240 -0.258 -0.225 0.038 0.000 1 -0.036 -0.084 0.023 0.137 -0.106 -0.107 -0.343 -0.269 -0.143 
AT&C -0.153 -0.236 -0.243 0.386 -0.149 0.207 -0.100 -0.036 1 -0.348 -0.006 -0.475 0.069 0.125 -0.362 0.424 -0.077 
GDP 0.215 0.427 0.405 0.253 0.425 -0.140 0.170 -0.084 -0.348 1 -0.070 -0.059 -0.061 -0.086 0.422 -0.393 -0.069 
GRW 0.076 -0.012 -0.026 0.008 0.004 -0.035 -0.342 0.023 -0.006 -0.070 1 -0.036 -0.066 0.039 0.008 -0.110 0.057 
HDI 0.131 0.159 0.192 -0.138 0.113 0.063 0.000 0.137 -0.475 -0.059 -0.036 1 0.010 -0.065 0.330 -0.202 -0.245 
PRESI -0.085 -0.089 -0.041 -0.071 -0.099 -0.005 -0.061 -0.106 0.069 -0.061 -0.066 0.010 1 0.528 -0.037 0.146 0.066 
COALI -0.062 -0.071 -0.051 0.014 -0.113 -0.024 -0.148 -0.107 0.125 -0.086 0.039 -0.065 0.528 1 -0.032 0.090 0.149 
ROAD 0.200 0.315 0.195 0.155 0.253 -0.050 0.127 -0.343 -0.362 0.422 0.008 0.330 -0.037 -0.032 1 -0.092 0.168 
EXP -0.300 -0.358 -0.332 -0.103 -0.274 0.092 0.089 -0.269 0.424 -0.393 -0.110 -0.202 0.146 0.090 -0.092 1 -0.023 
SESEC -0.069 -0.013 -0.091 -0.046 -0.137 -0.221 -0.072 -0.143 -0.077 -0.069 0.057 -0.245 0.066 0.149 0.168 -0.023 1 
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Equation (6) presents the econometric specification of the model that we estimate. The 
cost frontier is defined using a transcendental logarithmic (translog) cost function, 
which can be considered a second-order approximation to the firms’ underlying cost 
function. Therefore, our cost function can be expressed as: 
ln (
𝐷_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡
) = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑝 ln 𝑦𝑝𝑖𝑡
4
𝑝=1 + 𝛽𝐿 ln (
𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑃𝑅𝑡
) + 𝛽𝑡𝑡  
 + ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑝𝑞 ln 𝑦𝑝𝑖𝑡
4
𝑞=1 ln 𝑦𝑞𝑖𝑡
4
𝑝=1 +
1
2
𝛽𝐿𝐿 [ln (
𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑃𝑅𝑡
)]
2
+
1
2
𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑡
2 
 + ∑ 𝛽𝑝𝐿 ln 𝑦𝑝𝑖𝑡 ln (
𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑃𝑅𝑡
)4𝑝=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑝𝑡 ln 𝑦𝑝𝑖𝑡
4
𝑝=1 + 𝛽𝑡𝐿𝑡 ln (
𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑃𝑅𝑡
) 
+𝛽𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + exp(∑ 𝛿𝑟
10
𝑟=1 𝑧𝑟𝑖𝑡) 𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗     (6) 
where α is the intercept of the cost frontier, y stands for our four outputs and z includes 
nine efficiency determinants and a time trend. 
The dependent variable in the model is the total annual cost of each utility (D_COST), 
often labelled as Totex (Total Expenditure). This variable aggregates the Opex 
(Operational Expenditure), which includes operations and maintenance, labour as well 
as other expenditures; and Capex (Capital Expenditure), which incorporates the 
depreciation of capital assets and total interest cost. The four outputs we consider are: 
Energy Sold (ENE), Number of Customers (CUS), Network Energy Losses (LOS) and 
Distribution Capacity (DCA).
13
 This set of variables can be defined as standard in the 
efficiency and productivity literature and benchmarking models used by sector 
regulators in incentive regulation of utilities (see Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001). Labour 
Price (LPR) is measured at firm-level and it is calculated using information about 
employees’ expenditure. This variable and the total cost are normalised using the 
Capital Price (KPR) in equation (6) to impose homogeneity of degree one in prices.
14
 
We include a time trend (t) to measure technical change and it interacts with the other 
variables in the translog cost function, which allows reflecting non-neutral technical 
change. A dummy that identifies the Private Firms (PRIV) is also used. 
Regarding the efficiency determinants, we introduce another time trend and 9 variables 
that may affect the firms’ performance. One of these variables is firm-specific, Average 
Technical and Commercial Losses (AT&C), while the remaining variables are measured 
at state-level. Energy losses can be seen as an institutional outcome that can be partially 
                                                          
13
 Energy Losses is introduced as an ‘undesirable’ output and it is expected to have an incremental effect 
on firms’ costs. We considered to include network length as an output, but this variable was not a 
significant cost driver in our model. Nevertheless, Distribution Capacity can be understood as a proxy of 
the size of the network. 
14
 Capital price is difficult to measure. We opt for a Wholesale Price Index (WPI) similar to Llorca et al. 
(2016) who use a Produce Price Index (PPI) in the case of US electricity transmission industry. 
11 
 
determined by the quality of the institutions at state-level (Kochhar et al., 2006; 
Subramanian, 2007).
15
 This variable is included because it mainly represents the theft 
and non-payment of electricity, which is one of the main issues in the Indian electricity 
distribution sector (Thakur et al., 2006). The GDP of the state, the growth of state GDP 
and the state Human Development index (HDI) have also been included as determinants 
of firms’ performance in the model. 
The last five variables have been introduced considering the study by Dash and Raja 
(2009). These authors empirically analyse the effect of institutions and quality of 
governance on economic growth and development in Indian states. They use as 
explanatory factors several variables and indices that can be grouped in three blocks: 
institutional indicators, extent and quality of state intervention and political environment 
of Indian states. We use a set of those variables that are relevant for the electricity 
distribution sector: (i) the number of times the President’s rule was imposed (PRESI); 
(ii) the number of times the Chief Minister headed the Coalition Government (COALI), 
reflecting both variables the political environment and stability of the state; (iii) the ratio 
of surfaced road length to total road length (ROAD), which is related to the condition of 
the state as provider of infrastructure and necessary goods and services; and (iv) the 
state public expenditure expressed as a percentage of state the GDP (EXP), reflecting 
the extent of the intervention of the state government in the economy. Additionally, we 
introduce the share of the secondary sector in the state GDP (SESEC) as a control 
variable in order to account for the level of industrialisation of the state. 
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates of three models.
16
 The first of them is a model 
in which the functional form of the cost frontier is a Cobb-Douglas. This ALS model 
does not incorporate efficiency determinants. As expected from a cost function, we 
observe that all the outputs coefficients are positive and statistically significant. If we 
summed up these cost elasticities of outputs we obtain 0.839, which represents the 
inverse of the elasticity of scale (Hanoch, 1975). This value evidences the existence of 
economies of scale in the Indian electricity distribution industry. The coefficient of the 
labour price is significant and positive, as it is also expected. 
The coefficient of the time trend is significant and negative, indicating the existence of 
technical change (i.e., total cost declines over time). The dummy of private ownership is 
significant and positive, indicating that private firms exhibit higher total costs. This 
result is not new; Bobde and Tanaka (2018) have found efficiency advantages of public 
electricity distribution utilities in India. Moreover, it is frequently asserted that 
                                                          
15
 Dash and Raja (2009) consider transmission and distribution losses as a proxy for rule of law and they 
use it as an institutional indicator in their analysis. 
16
 The subscript s in some of the variables introduced in the inefficiency term indicates that the variable is 
measured at state-level. 
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efficiency in the electricity sector depends more on the type of regulation than 
ownership (see Newbery, 1995; and for the case of India, Sen and Jamasb, 2012). 
In the second model in Table 3, we use a translog specification for the cost frontier, but 
we do not incorporate efficiency determinants. The results seem to be robust as all the 
first-order coefficients remain significant and with the expected sign, and most of the 
interactions between variables are also significant. The Likelihood Ratio (LR) test 
presented at the bottom of the table shows a value of 76.245 for the first model, which 
indicates that the Cobb-Douglas is rejected against the translog specification. Therefore, 
this is the specification that we will be using for estimating the RSCFG model that 
incorporates efficiency determinants. In addition, if we compare the RSCFG against the 
ALS model, both of them with a translog specification, we observe that the latter is 
rejected, so we can assume that the former is the one that best fits our data and hence it 
is our preferred model.
17
 
In the RSCFG model we observe similar results to those from both ALS models. The 
parameter estimates show the same signs than in the previous models and are in the 
same order of magnitude. Nevertheless, the incorporation of efficiency determinants 
seems to have reduced the statistical significance of some of the interactions between 
variables in the cost frontier. On the other hand, most of the variables in the efficiency 
term are significant and show the expected sign. The first of the variables, Average 
Technical and Commercial Losses, AT&C, shows a negative coefficient. This means 
that this variable has a negative effect on firms’ inefficiency. 
In conjunction with the result that we obtain for the variable energy losses in the 
frontier, we can state that there is an ambiguous relationship between network energy 
losses and firms’ costs. On the one hand, energy losses increase network costs as larger 
energy losses imply more intensive use of the network. It can be assumed that this 
involves higher maintenance and operation costs, i.e., Opex. On the other hand, energy 
losses increase firms’ efficiency, which results in lower costs. These larger efficiencies 
may arise from reductions in capital costs and investments (Capex) that make the capital 
appear to be more efficiently used. 
  
                                                          
17
 Other SFA models that allow the introduction of efficiency determinants through alternative ways were 
estimated: through the pre-truncation mean (Battese and Coelli, 1995) and both through the pre-truncation 
mean and variance (Wang, 2002) of the inefficiency term. These models were discarded, the first one is 
rejected against the RSCFG model based on the Vuong (1989) test for non-nested models and the second 
one due to lack of convergence. 
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Table 3: Parameters estimates of the models 
  ALS (Cobb-Douglas)  ALS (translog)  RSCFG (translog) 
 Variable Est. 
 
Est./s.e.  Est. 
 
Est./s.e.  Est. 
 
Est./s.e. 
Frontier            
 
Intercept 1.359 *** 51.72 
 
1.361 *** 27.82 
 
1.402 *** 21.72 
 ln ENEit 0.343 *** 4.73  
0.295 *** 4.15 
 
0.220 * 1.93 
 ln CUSit 0.265 *** 4.26  
0.188 *** 2.75 
 
0.199 ** 2.23 
 ln LOSit 0.090 *** 2.64  
0.105 *** 3.13 
 
0.135 ** 1.97 
 ln DCAit 0.142 ** 2.28  
0.214 *** 3.78 
 
0.228 ** 2.50 
 ln (LPRit/KPRit) 0.318 *** 4.97  
0.317 *** 4.81 
 
0.290 *** 2.96 
 t -0.048 *** -3.75 
 
-0.035 *** -2.86 
 
-0.058 *** -2.78 
 ½ (ln ENEit)
2
 
   
 
0.019 
 
0.06 
 
-0.114 
 
-0.26 
 ½ (ln CUSit)
2
 
    
0.108 
 
0.45 
 
0.075 
 
0.29 
 ½ (ln LOSit)
2
 
   
 
-0.011 
 
-0.14 
 
0.012 
 
0.10 
 ½ (ln DCAit)
2
 
   
 
0.747 *** 3.56 
 
0.644 ** 2.10 
 ½ [ln (LPRit/KPRit)]
2
 
    
0.221 
 
1.26 
 
0.141 
 
0.46 
 ½ t
2
 
    
-0.031 * -1.88 
 
-0.034 
 
-1.55 
 ln ENEit · ln CUSit     
0.380 * 1.76 
 
0.441 
 
1.63 
 ln ENEit · ln LOSit     
0.217 ** 1.98 
 
0.175 
 
0.94 
 ln ENEit · ln DCAit     
-0.463 ** -2.40 
 
-0.414 
 
-1.64 
 ln ENEit · ln (LPRit/KPRit)     
0.333 * 1.65 
 
0.301 
 
0.97 
 ln ENEit · t     
-0.028 
 
-0.74 
 
-0.048 
 
-0.71 
 ln CUSit · ln LOSit     
0.052 
 
0.61 
 
0.064 
 
0.48 
 ln CUSit · ln DCAit     
-0.433 ** -2.54 
 
-0.405 * -1.81 
 ln CUSit · ln (LPRit/KPRit)     
0.342 * 1.84 
 
0.391  1.55 
 ln CUSit · t     
-0.085 ** -2.50 
 
-0.073  -1.41 
 ln LOSit · ln DCAit     
-0.082 
 
-1.00 
 
-0.063 
 
-0.53 
 ln LOSit · ln (LPRit/KPRit)     
0.113 
 
1.25 
 
0.138  0.86 
 ln LOSit · t     
-0.049 ** -2.40 
 
-0.044 
 
-1.46 
 ln DCAit · ln (LPRit/KPRit)     
-0.622 *** -4.72 
 
-0.680 *** -3.43 
 ln DCAit · t     
0.111 *** 3.64 
 
0.116 ** 2.34 
 ln (LPRit/KPRit) · t     
0.036 
 
1.07 
 
0.011 
 
0.20 
 PRIVi 0.229 *** 3.38  
0.219 *** 2.81 
 
0.216 ** 2.42 
             
Noise term 
           
 
ln (σv
2
) -3.586 *** -12.73  -4.066 *** -13.53  -4.140 *** -12.69 
          
    Inefficiency term (variance) 
      
    
 
Intercept -0.571 *** -5.22  -0.757 *** -7.32 -1.022 *** -8.69
 
AT&Cit         
-0.031 * -1.92 
 
ln GDPst        
 -0.711 *** -4.27 
 
GRWst         
0.069 *** 3.14 
 
HDIs         
-2.844 ** -2.21 
 
PRESIst         
-0.542 
 
-0.84 
 
COALIst         
0.768 ** 2.02 
 
ROADst         
0.011 * 1.81 
 EXPst         
-0.178 *** -2.86 
 SESECst         
-0.054 *** -3.36 
 t 
        
0.303 *** 3.71 
 Number of observations 312  312  312 
 Log-likelihood -192.774  -154.652  -127.656 
 Chi-squared LR test  76.245 ***  53.991 ***  - 
  (21)  (10)  - 
Notes: Significance code: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
The unrestricted model in model selection LR tests is the one immediate to the right. Degrees of freedom in parentheses. 
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If we pay attention to the variables measured at state-level, we find quite reasonable 
results. GDP has a negative effect on inefficiency, while the growth of this variable 
increases inefficiency. This latter result, which can be seen by some readers as 
counterintuitive, may be related to an issue of adjustments costs. It is not unreasonable 
to assume that large (and perhaps unexpected) growths or decreases in GDP of Indian 
states could be related to a more difficult decision-making process and larger 
inefficiencies in the management of electric utilities.
18
 A similar result is found by 
Llorca et al. (2016), who observe that a positive growth in electricity demand has a 
negative effect on the efficiency of the US electricity transmission utilities. They 
attribute this finding to the anticipation of investments (that are expected to be 
efficiently used in the future, but not at present) to meet future demand. HDI which is a 
composite index of health, education and income (for more details see the Appendix) 
exhibits a negative and significant effect on cost inefficiency that may reflect a positive 
influence of the quality of the manpower over firms’ management. 
Regarding the variables that are more directly related to the quality of institutions and 
governance, we observe that PRESI is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, COALI 
is positive and significant. Although a coalition government reduces the dominance of 
individual parties, it may not necessarily be a stable government. Some decisions on 
relevant matters could take longer to be made and hence it is expected that “instability 
of policy at higher levels of administration promotes inefficiency” (Adelman and 
Morris, 1971, p.77). This circumstance seems to hinder the efficient management of the 
utilities in our sample. The coefficient of ROAD is slightly significant and positive, 
suggesting that the percentage of surfaced road in the state increases inefficiency of the 
utilities. This result might reflect a trade-off between the spending on transport 
infrastructure and the electricity sector, or a crowding out effect triggered by state 
public investment resulting in a poorer management of the utilities. On the contrary, the 
variable EXP shows a negative and highly significant coefficient. This could be seen as 
rather counterintuitive because a higher ratio of public expenditure over GDP indicates 
a stronger state intervention in the economy and this could leave room for more 
corruption and rent-seeking activities (Dash and Raja, 2009). However, this does not 
hold in our sample and it seems that higher public expenditure has a positive effect on 
the performance of the distribution utilities. In addition, the coefficient of the control 
variable, SESEC, is significant and indicates that a higher level of industrialisation in 
the state implies lower inefficiencies in the sector. 
Finally, the time trend is positive, indicating an increase of the inefficiency over time, as 
can be observed in Figure 1. It should be noted that the three estimated models present 
similar patters but different efficiency levels. The RSCFG, our preferred model, shows a 
                                                          
18
 Some authors like Bhide et al. (2005) argue that state GDP growth can be used as proxy for quality of 
institutions assuming that those states with higher growth are those with better institutions. However, this 
assumption may not necessarily hold (Dash and Raja, 2009). 
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decline in the average performance of the distribution utilities that has been uneven 
along the analysed period. In the initial year, the average efficiency score of the utilities 
was 71.7%. It augmented the year after, just before starting to decrease until reaching 
65.2% in the final year of the sample. 
 
Figure 1: Average efficiency score over time 
 
 
The mean efficiency for the whole period was 69.3% which is similar to those by 
Thakur et al. (2006) for 26 state owned electric utilities for 2001-2002.
19
 The found an 
average total efficiency of 68% using a CCR (Charnes et al., 1978) formulation, while 
the average technical efficiency when they use a BCC (Banker et al., 1984) formulation 
is 84%. Moreover, they find larger inefficiencies for larger utilities which also coincide 
with the results that we obtain from our models. This is evidenced by a correlation of -
14.4% between the cost efficiencies and the energy sold in our sample. 
 
Post estimation analysis of results 
In order to gain a better understanding of the influence of institutions on the 
performance of the electricity sector, we carried out a simulation. Figure 2 shows the 
potential cost savings per state produced by an improvement in the quality of 
institutions in our sample. The blue bars represent the percentage of savings with 
respect to total cost that could be made by electricity distribution companies in each 
                                                          
19
 In addition to differences related to the sample and period, it must be said that the model utilised by 
Thakur et al. (2006) is DEA, which is a nonparametric approach and different from the parametric 
approach employed here. As it has been suggested in Section 3, the use of alternative approaches can 
produce very different results. Therefore, we provide the information here as a mere reference. 
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state for the period from 2006-07 to 2011-12 if there would be a marginal improvement 
in our proxies for the quality of institutions each year.
20
 The average value of the cost 
savings for the whole sample represents 8.73%, although substantial differences can be 
observed between states. For example, for Goa and Jammu and Kashmir the size of the 
potential savings is lower than 5%, while for Jharkhand reaches a value of 31.57%. The 
savings for the overall sample and the whole period analysed amount to a total of 
37,788 Crore rupees (2011) (approximately 8 billion 2011 USD), ranging the savings 
per state between 28 (Goa) and 5,446 Crore rupees (2011) (Rajasthan). 
 
Figure 2: Cost savings related to an enhancement of institutions 
 
 
It is noteworthy that there are two features that make these computations be considered 
a lower bound for potential savings in the whole country. First, it is expected that 
improvements in the quality of institutions have in turn a wider effect on the economy 
that will be ultimately reflected in indicators such as the GDP or the HDI of the states 
over time. According to the parameters estimated and presented in Table 3, this ‘indirect 
effect’ can only boost the savings presented here and reinforces the importance of the 
quality of institutions on sectorial performance. Second, our sample does not cover all 
the utilities that service all 29 states and 7 union territories of the country. 
                                                          
20
 We simulate a marginal improvement in the quality of institutions as a simultaneous reduction of one 
unit in COALI (i.e., the number of times the Chief Minister headed the Coalition Government) along with 
an increase of 1% in EXP (i.e., the share of state public expenditure in state GDP). They should reflect a 
concurrent increase in political stability and governmental participation in the economy of each state. We 
do not consider PRESI and ROAD in simulations, the former due to lack of significance of its coefficient 
and the latter due to difficulties to fully justify its effect. It should be mentioned that the results of 
simulation do not change significantly when marginal improvements in ROAD are incorporated. 
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A chronic issue in the electricity distribution in India is the high level of network energy 
losses (Thakur et al., 2006). It could be argued that the magnitude of energy losses is 
interlinked with quality of institutions and regulation. In order to explore this issue we 
use the estimated elasticities to compute the marginal cost of the losses at observation-
level. Figure 3 shows two scatter plots of the marginal costs of energy losses versus the 
energy losses by the electric utilities. In Figure 3a the computed marginal costs only 
consider the estimated coefficients related to the variable LOS in the cost frontier. In 
Figure 3b it is additionally considered the effect of energy losses via the inefficiency 
term, i.e., through the variable AT&C.
21
 Both figures show a clear positive relationship 
indicating that as energy losses increases, the marginal cost of losses increases as well.
22
 
This relationship is also observed when these marginal costs are compared with the 
other outputs in the model. However, the most relevant matter when comparing these 
figures is the large number of observations that exhibit a negative marginal cost when 
the overall effect of energy losses on costs is considered, i.e., the effect through 
inefficiency is also incorporated in the computation. 
 
Figure 3: Marginal cost of energy losses 
Figure 3a: Frontier   Figure 3b: Frontier + Inefficiency term 
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 Taking into account that AT&C=100·LOS/(ENE+LOS), the ‘overall’ marginal cost of energy losses 
can be computed as: 
  𝑀𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆 =
𝜕 ln 𝐶
𝜕 ln 𝐿𝑂𝑆
𝐶
𝐿𝑂𝑆
= [
𝜕 ln 𝑓(𝑦,𝑤,𝑥,𝛽)
𝜕 ln 𝐿𝑂𝑆
+
𝐴𝑇&𝐶(100−𝐴𝑇&𝐶)
100
𝜕ℎ(𝑧,𝛿)
𝜕𝐴𝑇&𝐶
𝑢∗]
𝐶
𝐿𝑂𝑆
 
22
 Most of the observation-specific marginal costs that we obtain are in a reasonable order of magnitude. 
However, in cases that are far from sample mean (e.g., those which are largely negative), the estimates 
should be viewed with caution. The non-satisfaction of the regularity conditions imposed by economic 
theory is a fairly common issue when more flexible functional forms are used (Barnett et al., 1995). 
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As shown in Figure 3a, average marginal cost is 6.16, which indicates that (on average) 
a rise of one additional MU in energy losses is translated into an increase of 6.16 lakh 
rupees (2011) per MU (approximately 13.21 2011 USD per MWh) in total costs for the 
utilities. However, as previously mentioned, this result seems to contrast with the 
negative coefficient observed for the variable AT&C in the inefficiency term of our 
RSCFG model in Table 3. This coefficient indicates that as energy losses increase firms 
enhance their cost efficiency. We observe that the average marginal cost in Figure 3b is 
-5.18 lakh rupees (2011) per MU (approximately -11.12 2011 USD per MWh). This 
shows that utilities can reduce costs by limiting their energy loss reducing efforts. This 
makes sense when low prices make loss reduction activities uneconomic and/or when 
the cost of losses is passed to consumers. The figure also shows that for companies with 
small energy losses, which tend to be those in which also the number of customers and 
electricity delivered is lower, there may be incentives (e.g., not investing in improving 
their network as it increases their Capex) to increasing instead of reducing energy 
losses. This may be a consequence of a lack of regulatory incentives. 
Figure 4 presents the evolution of energy losses and AT&C over time for the average of 
our sample. Focusing on AT&C, we observe that there has been a reduction from 
almost 32% to 28.5%. This is in line with the results that we observed in Table 3 and 
Figure 1, increases (decreases) in AT&C improve (worsen) the cost efficiency of the 
utilities and the average efficiency has declined over time. Bringing together these 
results, we can infer that the average cost efficiency in our sample has decreased due to 
the efforts by the utilities to reduce their actual AT&C as in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Evolution of Energy Losses and AT&C over time 
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Nevertheless, the magnitude of energy losses during the same period has increased from 
about 4,000 to 4,800 MU’s. This indicates that the electricity injected in the system has 
grown at a higher pace than the reduction in the AT&C. This is a significant issue, 
because, as discussed earlier, some companies can have incentives to limit their energy 
loss reducing activities in the current regulatory regime in India. Finally, we highlight 
the importance of institutions along with the regulators to keep the efforts to reduce the 
still high levels of energy losses in India. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Since the 1990s, India has taken steps to reform its electricity sector as in many other 
countries around the world. The aim is to improve the efficiency of the sector and attract 
private capital. The mandate of the sector regulator is to oversee the functioning of the 
competitive and regulated segments of the sector and to ensure that consumers benefit 
from the achieved efficiency gains. In India, the enactment of the “Electricity Act, 
2003” had this objective. 
At the same time, there is ample literature that suggests that institutional endowment 
affects economic development of countries. Can we also trace the effect of institutional 
endowment to specific sectors and regions of a country? There is scarce empirical 
evidence on the effect of region-level institutions on the performance of firms. India is a 
suitable case to explore this link at firm- and state-level. The quality of institutions 
varies across the different Indian states and the absence of transparency and 
unproductive institutions often manifest itself in the form of corruption that in turn leads 
to economic inefficiency. 
We use a novel dataset and stochastic frontier techniques to analyse the cost efficiency 
of the Indian electricity distribution utilities in different states while determining the 
effect of quality of institutions on their efficiency. The findings show that energy losses 
increase the cost of networks as larger energy losses imply more intensive use of the 
network leading to higher maintenance and operation costs. We also find that firms with 
higher losses have higher efficiency which results in lower costs. The higher 
efficiencies may arise from underspending in loss reducing investments. Taking into 
account both effects, we obtain an average marginal cost of -5.18 lakh rupees per 
additional MU in energy losses, which indicates that the companies do not have 
sufficiently strong incentives to reduce their energy losses. Overall, we find an average 
cost efficiency of 69.3% and a declining efficiency over the period analysed. 
In addition, the results show that institutional and some other contextual factors such as 
Human Development Index, the country political context and the level of economic 
development have a significant effect on firm performance. This paper adds to the 
empirical evidence on the effect of institutional endowment but in a rare micro-level 
20 
 
study. Energy regulators need to take into account the high- and lower-level institutional 
factors when comparing efficiency of utilities and setting the financial incentives for 
improving their performance. 
The results obtained in this paper show that economic incentives alone are not sufficient 
for improving the efficiency of regulated firms and institutions constrain the ability of 
firms to realise their technical potential. Therefore, measures to improve the quality of 
institutions and in particular that of the state regulatory agencies can also be worthwhile 
investments with long-term rewards. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1: Data - Variables, definitions and sources 
Variable Data Source Definition 
Total Distribution Cost 
(D_COST) 
1. PFC (Power Finance Corporation). 2010. The 
Performance of State Power Utilities for the Years 2006-07 
to 2008-09. New Delhi. 
2. PFC (Power Finance Corporation). 2011. The 
Performance of State Power Utilities for the Years 2007-08 
to 2009-10. New Delhi. 
3. PFC (Power Finance Corporation). 2012. The 
Performance of State Power Utilities for the Years 2008-09 
to 2010-11. New Delhi. 
4. PFC (Power Finance Corporation). 2015. The 
Performance of State Power Utilities for the Years 2011-12 
to 2013-14. New Delhi. 
 Cost incurred in distributing the electricity to end consumers. It 
is calculated as: 
 
Totex – (Power Purchased Cost + Generation Cost) 
 
 Totex is made up of the following components: 
 
Power Purchased Cost + Generation Cost + Employee Cost + 
O&M Cost + Total Interest Cost + Depreciation + Admin. & 
Gen. Expenditure + Other Expenditure 
Energy Sold 
(ENE) 
1. PFC (Power Finance Corporation). 2010. The 
Performance of State Power Utilities for the Years 2006-07 
to 2008-09. New Delhi. 
2. PFC (Power Finance Corporation). 2011. The 
Performance of State Power Utilities for the Years 2007-08 
to 2009-10. New Delhi. 
3. PFC (Power Finance Corporation). 2012. The 
Performance of State Power Utilities for the Years 2008-09 
to 2010-11. New Delhi. 
4. PFC (Power Finance Corporation). 2015. The 
Performance of State Power Utilities for the Years 2011-12 
to 2013-14. New Delhi. 
 Total energy delivered to the end consumers in MU’s. 
Customers 
(CUS) 
1. Annual Reports of the corresponding / individual 
distribution utilities published yearly. 
2. Annual Revenue Requirement and Tariff Petition filed by 
 Number of end consumers served. 
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the distribution utilities to their respective State Electricity 
Regulatory Commission. 
Energy Losses 
(LOS) 
1. PFC (Power Finance Corporation). 2010. The 
Performance of State Power Utilities for the Years 2006-07 
to 2008-09. New Delhi. 
2. PFC (Power Finance Corporation). 2011. The 
Performance of State Power Utilities for the Years 2007-08 
to 2009-10. New Delhi. 
3. PFC (Power Finance Corporation). 2012. The 
Performance of State Power Utilities for the Years 2008-09 
to 2010-11. New Delhi. 
4. PFC (Power Finance Corporation). 2015. The 
Performance of State Power Utilities for the Years 2011-12 
to 2013-14. New Delhi. 
 It is calculated as: 
 
Net Energy Input – Energy Realised 
Distribution Capacity 
(DCA) 
1. Annual Reports of the corresponding / individual 
distribution utilities published yearly. 
2. Annual Revenue Requirement and Tariff Petition filed by 
the distribution utilities to their respective State Electricity 
Regulatory Commission. 
3. http://www.cag.gov.in/ 
 Distribution Transformer Capacity in MVA. 
Labour Price 
(LPR) 
1. PFC (Power Finance Corporation). 2010. The 
Performance of State Power Utilities for the Years 2006-07 
to 2008-09. New Delhi. 
2. PFC (Power Finance Corporation). 2011. The 
Performance of State Power Utilities for the Years 2007-08 
to 2009-10. New Delhi. 
3. PFC (Power Finance Corporation). 2012. The 
Performance of State Power Utilities for the Years 2008-09 
to 2010-11. New Delhi. 
4. PFC (Power Finance Corporation). 2015. The 
Performance of State Power Utilities for the Years 2011-12 
to 2013-14. New Delhi. 
4. Annual Revenue Requirement and Tariff Petition filed by 
 It is calculated as: 
 
Employees Expenditure / Number of Employees 
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the distribution utilities to their respective State Electricity 
Regulatory Commission. 
5. http://www.cag.gov.in/ 
Capital Price 
(KPR) 
Office of the Economic Adviser, Government of India, 
Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Department of Industrial 
Policy &Promotion (DIPP). 
 Wholesale Price Index (K, Machinery & machine tools). 
Private Utility 
(PRIV) 
http://cercind.gov.in/sebs.html 
 Distribution utility that is not under the control of State 
government. 
Average Technical and 
Commercial Losses 
(AT&C) 
1. PFC (Power Finance Corporation). 2010. The 
Performance of State Power Utilities for the Years 2006-07 
to 2008-09. New Delhi. 
2. PFC (Power Finance Corporation). 2011. The 
Performance of State Power Utilities for the Years 2007-08 
to 2009-10. New Delhi. 
3. PFC (Power Finance Corporation). 2012. The 
Performance of State Power Utilities for the Years 2008-09 
to 2010-11. New Delhi. 
4. PFC (Power Finance Corporation). 2015. The 
Performance of State Power Utilities for the Years 2011-12 
to 2013-14. New Delhi. 
 It is calculated as: 
 
((Net Energy Input – Energy Realised) / (Net Energy Input)) x 100 
Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) 
For Sl. No. 1-32 - Directorate of Economics Statistics of 
respective State Governments, and for All-India - Central 
Statistical Organisation; Released on 1
st
 March, 2014. 
 Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) at Current Prices (as on 
31-05-2014) (Rupee in Crores). 
Human Development 
Index 
(HDI) 
Planning Commission (2011), India human development 
report 2011: Towards social inclusion, Government of India, 
New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
 It is a composite index of outcome indicators that comprises 
three dimensions: life expectancy, acquisition of education and 
knowledge, and the standard of living and command over 
resources (Planning Commission, 2011). It is computed as 
follows: 
 
HDI = 1/3 (Health index + Education Index + Income index) 
Number of Times the http://www.worldstatesmen.org/India_states.html  In the Republic of India, “Article 356 provides for the 
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President’s Rule Was 
Imposed 
(PRESI) 
imposition of President’s Rule in States to combat a situation 
‘in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in 
accordance with the provisions of the constitution’” (Arora, 
1990, p.1). 
Number of Times the 
Chief Minister Headed 
the Coalition 
Government 
(COALI) 
http://www.worldstatesmen.org/India_states.html 
 “Coalition government is a combination of heterogeneous 
socio-political elements which are susceptible to political 
turmoil and storms emerging from changing socio-political 
conditions and compulsions” (Patil, 2001, p.587). “A coalition 
government always remains in pulls and pressures particularly 
in a multinational country like India” (Malik and Malik, 2014, 
p.1). 
Ratio of Surfaced Road 
Length to Total Road 
Length 
(ROAD) 
Infrastructure Statistics - 2014 (Third issue, VOL. II) 
published by Central Statistics Office Ministry of Statistics 
and Programme Implementation Government of India, New 
Delhi. www.mospi.nic.in 
 A surfaced road is considered “a road with a hard smooth 
surface of bitumen or tar” (Taral, 2015, p.2). 
Ratio of State Public 
Expenditure as a 
Percentage of Total 
State Gross Domestic 
Product 
(EXP) 
India, State Finances: A Study of State Budgets (Mumbai, 
Reserve Bank of India, 2011-12). 
 “Measures the degree of Government intervention in various 
economic activities. A higher ratio indicates more State 
intervention in the economy and there is a greater scope for 
corruption and other kinds of rent-seeking activities. Hence, 
unnecessary State interventions preclude productive activities 
and encroach upon the freedom of private individuals, 
subsequently creating stumbling blocks for economic 
prosperity” (Dash and Raja, 2009, p.9). 
Percentage Share of 
Secondary Sector in 
State Gross Domestic 
Product Growth 
(SESEC) 
Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) and Ministry of 
Industry, Government of India, 2013. 
 Percentage contribution of Industry Sector in GSDP Growth. 
This variable essentially reflects the level of industrialisation of 
the state. 
 
